




BORN IN THE U.S.A., BUT NOT NATURAL BORN:  HOW 
CONGRESSIONAL TERRITORIAL POLICY BARS NATIVE-BORN 
PUERTO RICANS FROM THE PRESIDENCY 
John R. Hein* 
“No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the 
United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall 
be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eli-
gible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty 
five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United 
States.”1 
One of the “best aspects of the American political tradition” is the 
notion that every American child—regardless of race, creed, gender, 
or social status—can grow up to become President.2  On first glance, 
the language of Article II, Section 1, clause 5 of the United States 
Constitution enshrines this notion into the highest law of the land—
the only permanent discriminatory bar to the American presidency is 
that candidates be “natural born” citizens.3  Incorporation of the 
Twelfth Amendment places the same limitation on eligibility for the 
vice-presidency.4 
But the meaning of this “natural born”5 proviso long has been the 
subject of controversy because it is not defined anywhere in the Con-
stitution.6  The Supreme Court has ruled without doubt that United 
States citizens born to parents who are subject to United States juris-
 
 * J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2009; B.A., Harvard College, 2006. 
 1 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
 2 See Randall Kennedy, A Natural Aristocracy?, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 175, 175–176 (1995) 
(arguing for the importance of the formal proposition that every native-born American 
child could conceivably grow up to become President). 
 3 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.  The age and residency requirements can be viewed as tem-
porary bars in that anyone who has reached the age of thirty-five and has resided in the 
United States for at least fourteen years becomes eligible for the presidency. 
 4 U.S. CONST. amend. XII (“But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of Presi-
dent shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States.”). 
 5 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
 6 See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 167 (1874) (“The Constitution does not, 
in words, say who shall be natural-born citizens.”). 
  
424 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 11:2 
 
diction in one of the fifty states are unquestionably natural born citi-
zens and therefore eligible for the presidency and vice-presidency.7  
But immigrants who become United States citizens through a natu-
ralization process are not eligible for either office because the Su-
preme Court has ruled that these citizens clearly do not qualify as 
natural born under Article II.8  Critics of the clause have described it 
as “opaque” for its ambiguity of language9 and “an instance of rank 
superstition”10 for its role in distinguishing between the rights of citi-
zens based on their place of birth.  Some have gone so far as to 
charge that the Natural Born Clause is “un-American.”11  This latter 
charge is most often leveled by critics advocating that foreign-born 
citizens should also be eligible for the office of the presidency.12 
The impact of the Natural Born Clause does not stop at foreign-
born naturalized citizens, however.  The language of Article II casts a 
shadow of doubt over the status of Native Americans who are mem-
bers of tribes recognized by the United States government,13 children 
 
 7 See Sarah Helene Duggin & Mary Beth Collins, ‘Natural Born’ in the USA:  The Striking Un-
fairness and Dangerous Ambiguity of the Constitution’s Presidential Qualifications Clause and Why 
We Need to Fix It, 85 B.U. L. REV. 53, 90–91 (2005). See also Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 328 
(1939) (holding that a person born in New York City did not lose citizenship by virtue of 
moving to Sweden and becoming a Swedish citizen); Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 
85 (1934) (holding that a person born abroad is a United States citizen if his or her fa-
ther was a citizen and the father was at some time a resident of the United States); United 
States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 702 (1898) (noting Congress’s authority to confer 
citizenship on children born abroad to United States citizens). 
 8 See Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 165 (1964) (“[T]he rights of citizenship of the native 
born and of the naturalized person are of the same dignity and are coextensive.  The only 
difference drawn by the Constitution is that only the ‘natural born’ citizen is eligible to be 
President.”); Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 22 (1913) (“[A] naturalized citizen stands 
on an equal footing with the native citizen in all respects, save that of eligibility to the 
Presidency.”). 
 9 See Duggin & Collins, supra note 7, at 55 (2005) (“While the language of this portion of 
Article II may appear clear on its face, few constitutional provisions are actually so 
opaque.”). 
 10 See Kennedy, supra note 2, at 176 (describing the natural born requirement as nothing 
but “idolatry of mere place of birth”). 
 11 Akhil Reed Amar, Natural Born Killjoy, LEGAL AFF., Apr./Mar. 2004, at 16.  See also Ken-
nedy, supra note 2, at 176 (arguing that the natural-born citizen requirement presumes 
that some citizens are “a bit more American” than other citizens); Robert Post, What Is the 
Constitution’s Worst Provision?, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 193 (1995) (criticizing the valid-
ity of birthplace as a “proxy for allegiance”). 
 12 See Duggin & Collins, supra note 7, at 136–37 (reasoning that the natural born distinction 
is based on faulty presumptions); Kennedy, supra note 2, at 176 (arguing that all citizens 
should be eligible to seek the nation’s highest office). 
 13 See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 109 (1884) (holding that a member of an Indian tribe rec-
ognized by the United States was not a citizen of the United States pursuant to the Four-
teenth Amendment because he was not born “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United 
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born to U.S. citizens living abroad,14 and those born in U.S. embas-
sies, on military bases, and in other areas within the jurisdiction of 
the United States.15  From this last group emerges the interesting case 
of citizens born in United States territories, such as Puerto Rico.  
Such citizens clearly are not foreign born, but are these citizens natu-
ral born for purposes of Article II and, in turn, eligible to run for the 
presidency? 
The answers to these questions have an obvious impact on the 
pool of potential presidential candidates in future elections, though 
the issue has arisen in the past.  Barry Goldwater, the Republican 
senator and presidential candidate in the 1964 election, was born in 
the Arizona territory in 1909—three years prior to Arizona state-
hood.16  His eligibility for the presidency, however, was never ques-
tioned at the time,17 so the issue was neither raised nor resolved.  
Four years later, the eligibility of another Republican presidential 
candidate—George Romney, the Governor of Michigan—was chal-
lenged on the grounds that he was born to American missionaries in 
Chihuahua, Mexico.18  Romney withdrew before the race was over, 
though, and the status of a citizen born of American citizens abroad 
also remained unresolved.19  John McCain, United States Senator 
from Arizona and the Republican nominee in the 2008 presidential 
 
States).  But see Act of June 2, 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253 (codified as amended 
at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2006)) (conferring citizenship upon all Native Americans so long 
as they were born inside the territorial limits of the United States). 
 14 See Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657, 670 (1927) (“[A]t common law the children of our 
citizens born abroad were always natural born citizens from the standpoint of this Gov-
ernment . . . .”).  But see United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 702–03 (1898) (“A 
person born out of the jurisdiction of the United States can only become a citizen by be-
ing naturalized, either by treaty, as in the case of the annexation of foreign territory; or by 
authority of Congress, exercised either by declaring certain classes of persons to be citi-
zens, as in the enactments conferring citizenship upon foreign-born children of citizens, 
or by enabling foreigners individually to become citizens by proceedings in the judicial 
tribunals, as in the ordinary provisions of the naturalization acts.”). 
 15 See Duggin & Collins, supra note 7, at 102–03 (discussing the eligibility of children born in 
these areas of United States jurisdiction). 
 16 THEODORE H. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1964, at 211–12 (1965) (detailing 
Goldwater’s birth in the Arizona Territory in 1909). 
 17 See Charles Gordon, Who Can Be President of the United States:  The Unresolved Enigma, 28 MD. 
L. REV. 1, 28 n.219 (1968) (noting the dismissal of a state court suit challenging Goldwa-
ter’s candidacy on the grounds that he was not a natural born citizen). 
 18 See Warren Weaver, Romney’s Foes, or Friends, Expected to File Court Test of His Citizenship, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 1, 1967, at 28 (detailing the challenge to Governor George Romney’s bid for 
the Republican nomination in 1968). 
 19 Gordon, supra note 17, at 28. 
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election, was born in the Panama Canal Zone in 1936.20  Scholars 
have argued that his presidential eligibility is protected first by the 
common law principle of jus soli—Latin for “right of the soil”21—
because the Canal Zone was, at the time of his birth, a United States 
possession, and second by the principle of jus sanguinis—Latin for 
“right of blood”22—because his parents were both United States citi-
zens at the time of his birth.23  Residents of Puerto Rico—a United 
States territory with Commonwealth status24—are made citizens at 
birth by statute.25  Are these citizens more akin to naturalized immi-
grants, Native Americans, Barry Goldwater, John McCain, or natural 
born citizens native to one of the states? 
This Comment examines the Natural Born Citizen Clause in Arti-
cle II of the United States Constitution as it relates to the narrow case 
of citizens native-born to United States territories, particularly Puerto 
Rico.  Puerto Rico receives special attention for several reasons:  the 
unique history by which it became a United States territory; the con-
tinued interest its citizens have in determining the political status of 
the island26; Congress’s inability—or unwillingness—to resolve that 
status; and the fact that of all the territories under U.S. jurisdiction, 
Puerto Rico is the most likely to be considered for statehood.27  These 
factors collectively make the case of Puerto Rico one of particular sa-
 
 20 See JAMES W. JOHNSON, ARIZONA POLITICIANS:  THE NOBLE AND THE NOTORIOUS 10 (2002) 
(stating that John McCain was born in the Panama Canal Zone). 
 21 See GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS:  AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 148 (7th ed. 1996) (defining jus soli as the right or law of the soil). 
 22 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 868 (7th ed. 1999) (defining jus sanguinis as “[t]he rule that a 
child’s citizenship is determined by the parent’s citizenship”). 
 23 See James C. Ho, Unnatural Born Citizens and Acting Presidents, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 575, 
579 (2000) (arguing that although McCain was born in the Canal Zone, he is a natural 
born citizen under the common law). 
 24 See, e.g., Trailer Marine Transp. Corp. v. Rivera Vazquez, 977 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1992) 
(holding that Puerto Rico—like the District of Columbia, the Virgin Islands, and Guam—
is not a “state” within the meaning of the Constitution.  Its status has altered over the pe-
riod since it became a territory of the United States, culminating in an agreement in 
1952, approved by the citizens of Puerto Rico, that Puerto Rico should have a unique 
“Commonwealth” status; but the unique status is not statehood within the meaning of the 
Constitution). 
 25 See Act of June 27, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-477, 48 Stat. 1245 (extending United States citi-
zenship to Puerto Ricans born on or after April 11, 1899). 
 26 See DICK THORNBURGH, PUERTO RICO’S FUTURE:  A TIME TO DECIDE 6 (2007) (noting that 
plebiscites for Puerto Ricans to determine the status of the island have been held in 1967, 
1993, and 1998). 
 27 See id. at 5–6 (noting that Puerto Rico is the largest, most populous, and most economi-
cally significant of all the remaining territories of the United States; four million people 
of Puerto Rican birth or descent live within the mainland United States; and Puerto Rico 
has a continued strategic importance to the United States’ presence in Latin America). 
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lience in resolving the constitutionality of native-born citizens in 
United States territories seeking the presidency and the practical im-
plications of these results. 
From the outset, it is worth noting that the current political and 
legal status of Puerto Rico and its citizens is one of continued contro-
versy, subject to impassioned viewpoints.28  For the purpose of fully 
analyzing the question of natural-born citizenship in relation to na-
tive-born Puerto Ricans, this Comment accepts the current status of 
and law governing the island and its citizens without opining on what 
is best for Puerto Rico. 
Part I provides a historical and legal overview of the natural born 
citizen proviso of Article II.  This section distinguishes the meaning 
of natural born citizens from that of “naturalized” citizens in order to 
fully extract the subtle but important difference between the two 
phrases. 
Part II examines the territorial incorporation and naturalization 
powers exclusive to Congress and the manner in which Congress and 
the Courts have recognized the citizenship of persons whose status is 
not immediately apparent.  This section demonstrates that Congress, 
through these powers, holds the authority to decide the political 
status of territories and, in turn, the citizenship status and presiden-
tial eligibility of the citizens of these territories. 
Part III analyzes the legal and political status of Puerto Rico and 
citizens native-born to the U.S. territories.  After comparing the Con-
gressional treatment of Puerto Rico as a territory and the way in 
which Congress conferred citizenship to Puerto Ricans, this section 
concludes that native-born citizens of Puerto Rico—as well as those 
native-born of other United States territories—are ineligible for the 
presidency. 
Finally, Part IV considers the implications of these conclusions, 
arguing that any other finding would exacerbate, rather than allevi-
ate, the underlying problem—the unincorporated status of Puerto 
Rico. 
 
 28 See Johnny Smith, Note, Commonwealth Status:  A Good Deal for Puerto Rico?, 10 HARV. 
LATINO L. REV. 263, 271 (2007) (describing how the three major political parties of 
Puerto Rico reflect the three major viewpoints on political status for the island—the 
Puerto Rican Independence Party favors independence, the New Progressive Party favors 
statehood, and the Popular Democratic Party supports some form of the current com-
monwealth status). 
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I.  DISTINGUISHING NATURAL BORN FROM NATURALIZED 
A.  The Historical Origins of the Natural Born Citizen Proviso 
Several commentators have suggested29 that the natural born citi-
zen requirement for presidential eligibility originates from a July 25, 
1787 letter sent by John Jay to George Washington, and possibly to 
other delegates at the Constitutional Convention, which stated:   
Permit me to hint, whether it would be wise and seasonable to provide a 
strong check to the admission of Foreigners into the administration of 
our national Government; and to declare expressly that the Command in 
Chief of the American army shall not be given to nor devolve on, any but 
a natural born Citizen.30 
Jay’s letter was likely prompted by suspicion of ambitious foreign-
ers who served in the Revolutionary cause, or a response to Conven-
tion discussions of a monarchy headed by a foreign ruler.31  Regard-
less of his motives, his letter predated the appearance of the phrase 
“natural born citizen” in the Committee of Eleven report by six 
weeks,32 and is therefore thought to be the source of the phrase in the 
Constitution.33  Ultimately, the “natural born citizen” language was 
 
 29 See Charles C. Thach, Jr., The Creation of the Presidency, 1775–1789:  A Study in Constitutional 
History, in 40 JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 
415, 551 (1922) (providing a comprehensive discussion of the constitutional provisions 
relating to the Presidency).  See also Gordon, supra note 17, at 5 & n.27 (supporting the 
Thach hypothesis that John Jay’s letter to George Washington is the most likely source of 
the “natural born citizen” language in the Constitution). 
 30 See Gordon, supra note 17, at 5 (emphasis omitted) (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 4 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 237 (1905)). 
 31 See Thach, supra note 29, at 551 (“[T]here can be little doubt that it was [von Steu-
ben] . . . with his sympathies for the followers of Shay, and his evidently suspected deal-
ings with Prince Henry of Prussia, whom Jay had in mind when he penned these words.”); 
id. at 551 (suggesting distrust of Baron von Steuben, who had served in the Revolutionary 
forces but whom Jay distrusted); Cyril C. Means, Jr., Is Presidency Barred to Americans Born 
Abroad?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 23, 1955, at 28 (quoting Pa. Journal, Aug. 22, 
1787) (stating that to quell popular fears that the Convention was considering foreigners 
for the presidency, the delegates released an official statement to the Philadelphia press 
stating:  “We are informed that many letters have been written to the members of the 
Federal Convention . . . respecting the reports idly circulating that it is intended to estab-
lish a monarchical government, to send for [Prince Frederick Augustus], &c. &c.—to 
which it has been uniformly answered, ‘though we cannot, affirmatively, tell you what we 
are doing, we can, negatively, tell you what we are not doing—we never once thought of a 
king.’”). 
 32 Jill A. Pryor, Note, The Natural-Born Citizen Clause and Presidential Eligibility:  An Approach for 
Resolving Two Hundred Years of Uncertainty, 97 YALE L.J. 881, 888 (1988) (“The letter is 
generally assumed to be the source of the phrase in the Constitution.”). 
 33 See Gordon, supra note 17, at 4–5 (detailing the sequence of events leading up to the in-
clusion of the natural born proviso in the presidential eligibility clause of the Constitu-
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introduced by the Committee of Eleven and adopted by the Conven-
tion without debate.34 
At least one other commentator has noted that Jay’s letter and the 
adoption of the natural born language might very well have been 
prompted by a document written by Alexander Hamilton on June 18, 
1787—about a month prior to Jay’s letter.35  “Hamilton submitted a 
‘sketch of a plan of government which ‘was meant only to give a more 
correct view of his ideas, and to suggest the amendments which he 
should probably propose . . . in . . . future discussion.’’36  Article IX, 
section 1 of that sketch provided [an early version of the presidential 
eligibility clause]:  “‘No person shall be eligible to the office of Presi-
dent of the United States unless he be now a Citizen of one of the 
States, or hereafter be born a Citizen of the United States.’”37  Similar 
to Article II, Section 1, clause 5 of the Constitution, Hamilton’s 
sketch for presidential eligibility provides that those who were cur-
rently citizens of the United States at the time of the adoption of the 
Constitution would not be excluded from the presidency.  But unlike 
the Constitution’s requirement, Hamilton’s sketch requires only that 
the President be born a citizen; there is no natural born requirement.  
Thus, according to Hamilton’s sketch, the President need not be na-
tive born, but must be a citizen from birth.38  That the Constitution 
bypassed such language in favor of Jay’s suggests that the natural 
born language had a very specific meaning to the Framers,39 just as 
did the other presidential requirements—that candidates be at least 
thirty-five years old and U.S. residents for fourteen years.40 
 
tion); Christina S. Lohman, Presidential Eligibility:  The Meaning of the Natural-Born Citizen 
Clause, 36 GONZ. L. REV. 349, 352–53 (2001) (tracing the source of the Natural Born Citi-
zen Clause back to John Jay’s letter to George Washington). 
 34 See Gordon, supra note 17, at 4 (citing JONATHAN ELLIOT, 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL 
STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS 
RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 289 (2d ed. 
1891) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES]); Lohman, supra note 33, at 352–53 (describing 
the Committee of Eleven’s adoption of the language). 
 35 See Pryor, supra note 32, at 888–89 (concluding that the speculations of Jay’s motives are 
buttressed by the earlier Hamilton document containing different language which would 
have had a different impact on presidential eligibility). 
 36 Id. at 889 (quoting 3 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 
at 617 (rev. ed. 1937)). 
 37 Id. (quoting 3 FARRAND, supra note 36, at 629). 
 38 See Pryor, supra note 32, at 889 (analyzing the presidential requirements in Article IX, 
section 1 of Hamilton’s submitted sketch). 
 39 See Lohman, supra note 33, at 353 (arguing that the natural born language meant some-
thing very specific to the Framers). 
 40 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
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B.  The Meaning of “Natural Born” 
Traditional inquiries into the meaning of the natural born proviso 
search for the Framers’ original intent of the term “natural born” at 
the time of the adoption of the Constitution.41  As other commenta-
tors have noted, there are several problems with the traditional ap-
proach.42  The presidential qualification clause in Article II, section 1, 
clause 5 marks the only appearance of the phrase “natural born” in 
the Constitution,43 and nowhere does the Constitution define the 
phrase.44  Furthermore, no explanation of the meaning or intent of 
the natural born proviso appears anywhere in the recorded delibera-
tions of the Constitutional Convention of 1787.45 
In the absence of direct evidence from the Convention, the tradi-
tional approach looks next to the guidance of English common law.46 
in which the colonial legal system was grounded.47  Although the Su-
preme Court has never directly addressed the natural born citizen 
clause, the Court has analyzed the evolution of the common law re-
 
 41 See Pryor, supra note 32, at 882 (“Constitutional scholars have traditionally approached 
the uncertainty surrounding the meaning of the natural-born citizen clause by inquiring 
into the specific meaning of the term ‘natural born’ at the time of the Constitutional 
Convention.”). 
 42 See id. at 883 (“The traditional approach has not established the clause’s full and precise 
meaning, however, because it fails to adequately consider a critical analytical question 
that must inform our understanding of the constitutional text:  What is the proper role 
for Congress in giving specific content to the natural-born citizen clause?”). 
 43 See U.S. CONST. amend. XII (incorporating this language into the Constitution by dis-
qualifying for the Vice Presidency any person “constitutionally ineligible to the office of 
President”). 
 44 See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 167 (1874) (“The Constitution does not, 
in words, say who shall be natural-born citizens.”). 
 45 Gordon, supra note 17, at 3–4 (noting that the Convention wrote on a clean slate follow-
ing the Articles of Confederation, which did not provide for a Chief Executive).  See also 1 
ELLIOT’S DEBATES 143, 280 (detailing the deliberations of the members of the Committee 
on Detail, the five-man committee—Rutledge, Randolph, Gorham, Ellsworth, and Wil-
son—to which the Convention referred various resolutions, including the establishment 
of a national executive); Pryor, supra note 32, at 885–86 (providing a summation of the 
relevant records of the Constitutional Convention). 
 46 See Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478, (1888) (“There is, however, one clear exception 
to the statement that there is no national common law.  The interpretation of the Consti-
tution of the United States is necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are 
framed in the language of the English common law, and are to be read in the light of its 
history.”). 
 47 See Gordon, supra note 17, at 5 (exploring the British antecedents of the law of citizenship 
and presidential eligibility from monarchy to republic); Pryor, supra note 32, at 886–88 
(detailing the guiding principles of nationality law in England).  See also United States v. 
Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 654 (1898) (“In this, as in other respects, it must be inter-
preted in the light of the common law, the principles and history of which were familiarly 
known to the framers of the Constitution.”). 
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garding citizenship in America in the case of United States v. Wong Kim 
Ark:   
  The Constitution of the United States, as originally adopted, uses the 
words ‘citizen of the United States,’ and ‘natural-born citizen of the 
United States.’ . . .  
  The Constitution nowhere defines the meaning of these words, ei-
ther by way of inclusion or of exclusion, except in so far as this is done by 
the affirmative declaration that ‘all persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States.’  In this, as in other respects, it must be interpreted in the 
light of the common law, the principles and history of which were famil-
iarly known to the framers of the Constitution.  The language of the 
Constitution, as has been well said, could not be understood without ref-
erence to the common law.48 
The basic tenet of jus soli long guided nationality law in England.49  
Under this principle, anyone born on British soil, with few excep-
tions, was a “natural-born British subject.”50  British civil law, however, 
gradually adopted the principle of jus sanguinis, which granted natu-
ral born citizenship by descent or inheritance, not solely by birth-
right.51  This inherited English tradition became more complex when 
the American colonies passed their own naturalization laws prior to 
the adoption of the Declaration of Independence.52  There was no 
uniform rule of naturalization prior to the Naturalization Act of 
1790.53  This has led some to the conclusion that, at the time of the 
Constitutional Convention in 1787, there was no discernable com-
mon understanding of the definition of “natural born citizen.”54  This 
is too broad an overstatement, however, because what remains clear, 
whether the Framers’ understanding of “natural born citizen” fol-
lowed solely the principle of jus soli or also incorporated jus sanguinis 
at the time of Convention, is that “natural born citizen” at least meant 
 
 48 Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 654 (citations omitted). 
 49 See Gordon, supra note 17, at 6 (explaining how jus soli emerged out of feudal concepts of 
allegiance). 
 50 See Pryor, supra note 32, at 886 & n.24 (describing the meaning of jus soli). 
 51 See id. (describing the complications of tracing the adoption of English nationality law in 
the colonies because colonists inherited primarily, but not exclusively, English common 
law (jus soli) and not civil law (jus sanguinis)). 
 52 See id. at 887 & n.33 (describing the lack of uniformity among the naturalization laws of 
the various colonies). 
 53 Id. at 887.  Prior to Congress’s first exercise of the naturalization power (the Naturaliza-
tion Act of 1790), there were no uniform rules of naturalization. 
 54 See, e.g., id. at 887–88 & n.35 (maintaining that while there is no evidence that there was 
an agreed-upon meaning of “natural born citizen” at the time of the Constitutional Con-
vention, nothing in the British or early American traditions suggests that there were dif-
ferent meanings for the terms “naturalized,” “natural-born,” and “citizen at birth”). 
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jus soli—any native born citizen was a natural born citizen of the 
United States, with the traditional exceptions of children of diplo-
mats (whose allegiance remained to their respective countries).55  It is 
also clear what “natural born citizen” did not mean:  a naturalized 
citizen.  As Chancellor James Kent wrote in his Commentaries, the 
concern is one of allegiance:   
Natives are all persons born within the jurisdiction and allegiance of the 
United States.  This is the rule of the common law, without any regard or 
reference to the political condition or allegiance of their parents, with 
the exception of the children of ambassadors, who are, in theory, born 
within the allegiance of the foreign power they represent.56 
The Supreme Court has expressed a similar sentiment:  “To create 
allegiance by birth, the party must be born, not only within the terri-
tory, but within the ligeance of the government.”57 
If “natural born” incorporates the principle of jus sanguinis, 
someone like Senator John McCain is clearly a natural born citizen, 
because regardless of whether or not his birthplace counts as part of 
the United States and grants him natural born status through jus soli, 
he clearly inherits his natural born status by virtue of both of his par-
ents having been natural born citizens.  The same would not hold 
true for the vast majority of native-born Puerto Ricans, because their 
natural born status necessarily turns on whether or not birth in 
Puerto Rico grants them the right through jus soli.  This is so because 
if Puerto Rico does not grant these citizens natural born status via 
right of the soil, the only alternative is through right of inheritance.  
But, assuming their parents are native-born Puerto Ricans (and not 
citizens born on the mainland United States), their parents would 
not be natural born citizens by virtue of birthplace any more than are 
their children.  Thus, whether or not the Framers understood “natu-
ral born” as incorporating jus soli solely or in conjunction with jus 
sanguinis does not clear the ambiguity regarding the presidential eli-
gibility of native-born Puerto Ricans. 
C.  The Meaning of Naturalized and Naturalized at Birth 
The Fourteenth Amendment states, in relevant part:  “All persons 
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
 
 55 See generally United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 662 (1898) (discussing the 
meaning of natural born citizenship in light of the common law). 
 56 Id. at 664 (quoting 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 38–39 (6th ed. 
1848)). 
 57 Id. (quoting 2 KENT, supra note 56, at 42). 
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tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside.”58  The Supreme Court has interpreted this 
clause to mean that there are only two means of acquiring citizen-
ship:  birth and naturalization.59  The Immigration and Nationality 
Act of 1952 defined “naturalization” as “the conferring of nationality 
of a state upon a person after birth, by any means whatsoever.”60  
Thus, naturalized citizens are neither native born nor natural-born.  
The Court has made clear that, under the Constitution, “a natural-
ized citizen stands on an equal footing with the native citizen in all 
respects, save that of eligibility to the Presidency.”61 
What remains less clear is how to interpret the status of a statutory 
citizen naturalized at birth—that is, a person who is made a citizen at 
birth by statute, not by virtue of the Constitution.  The case of native-
born Puerto Ricans presents this very scenario of “statutory” United 
States citizens.62  Answering this question requires an examination of 
the territorial incorporation and naturalization powers exclusive to 
Congress and the manner in which Congress has recognized the citi-
zenship of Puerto Ricans. 
II.  CONGRESSIONAL POWER OVER TERRITORIES AND CITIZENSHIP 
A.  Congressional Power of Territorial Incorporation 
“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all need-
ful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property 
belonging to the United States . . . .”63 
Through the Territorial Clause, the Constitution grants Congress 
the exclusive power to regulate all territories of the United States.64  
The Continental Congress adopted the Northwest Ordinance of 
 
 58 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 59 See Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 165 (1964) (describing two paths to citizenship:  the 
native born path and the naturalized citizen path); Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 702 (“The 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, in the declaration that ‘all persons born or 
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the state wherein they reside,’ contemplates two sources of citizen-
ship, and two only:  birth and naturalization.”). 
 60 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(23) (1964).  A similar defi-
nition appeared in the Nationality Act of 1940, § 101(c), ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1137. 
 61 Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 22 (1913). 
 62 See THORNBURGH, supra note 26, at 2 (describing differences between U.S. nationals and 
“statutory” U.S. citizens). 
 63 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
 64 See id. 
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178765 as the territorial policy of the United States.66  Through this 
policy, Congress placed on the path of incorporation territories ac-
quired by the westward expansion of the United States.67  The North-
west Ordinance assumed territorial status was temporary.68  The end 
goal of the territorial incorporation process was statehood, and be-
tween 1796 and 1959, Congress admitted thirty-two incorporated ter-
ritories into the Union as states.69 
B.  Congressional Power of Naturalization and Judicial Interpretation 
“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o establish an uniform Rule 
of Naturalization . . . .”70 
Through the Naturalization Clause, the Constitution grants Con-
gress the exclusive power to establish a uniform rule of naturaliza-
tion.71  Pursuant to this power, Congress has passed several statutes 
concerning immigration and naturalization, culminating in the Im-
migration and Naturalization Act of 1952.72  This Act describes the 
procedures for immigrating to the United States and becoming a 
naturalized United States citizen.73  But the Act does not settle many 
of the ambiguities created by the Constitution’s “natural born” lan-
guage.  The following provides a brief overview of the manner in 
which Congress and the Courts have recognized the citizenship of 
persons whose status and presidential eligibility is not immediately 
apparent. 
 
 65 Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50. 
 66 See THORNBURGH, supra note 26, at 9, 45. 
 67 Id. 
 68 In reference to the original territory “north-west of the river Ohio” governed by the stat-
ute, the Northwest Ordinance pronounced that organization of the area as a territory was 
“for the purposes of temporary government.” See Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 51 
n.(a). 
 69 See THORNBURGH, supra note 26, at 9 & n.1 at 32.  Thornburgh list the territories admit-
ted to statehood under the territorial incorporation policy set down by the Northwest 
Ordinance as:  Tennessee (1796), Ohio (1803), Louisiana (1812), Indiana (1816), Missis-
sippi (1817), Illinois (1818), Alabama (1819), Missouri (1821), Arkansas (1836), Michi-
gan (1837), Florida (1845), Iowa (1846), Wisconsin (1848), California (1850), Minnesota 
(1858), Oregon (1859), Kansas (1861), Nevada (1864), Nebraska (1867), Colorado 
(1876), North Dakota (1889), South Dakota (1889), Montana (1889), Washington 
(1889), Idaho (1890), Wyoming (1890), Utah (1896), Oklahoma (1907), New Mexico 
(1912), Arizona (1912), Alaska (1959), and Hawaii (1959). 
 70 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1503 (2006)). 
 73 Id. 
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1.  Persons Born in United States Territories Prior to Statehood 
Senator Barry Goldwater, born in the Arizona territory in 1909, 
presents the only instance of a presidential candidate born in a 
United States territory prior to statehood.74  His candidacy was never 
challenged, and his defeat by President Lyndon B. Johnson pre-
vented any claims of a constitutional crisis from arising.  John Nance 
Garner, presidential candidate in the Democratic primary of 1932 
and Vice President for the first two terms of President Franklin De-
lano Roosevelt’s tenure in office, was born in Texas several months 
prior to its re-admittance into the Union in 1868 after the Civil War.75  
However, there is no record of any legal challenge to his qualifica-
tions for office on natural born grounds.76  Garner stepped down as 
Vice President in January, 1941, ending any further constitutional 
questions.77 
But Goldwater and Garner raise the issue of the presidential eligi-
bility of persons born in territories that later become states.  The only 
possibility of a modern-day Goldwater scenario would be if a citizen 
born in Alaska before January 3, 1959, or born in Hawaii before Au-
gust 21, 1959—i.e., prior to those states’ admittance into the Union—
ran for the presidency.78  From the time of its purchase by the United 
States from Russia in 1867, Alaska was considered an incorporated 
territory.79  Congress declared Hawaii an incorporated territory after 
April 30, 1900.80  An incorporated territory is one which has been in-
corporated into the body politic of the United States, usually by Con-
 
 74 See WHITE, supra note 16, at 211–12 (noting Goldwater’s birth in the Territory of Arizona 
in 1909). 
 75 See Duggin & Collins, supra note 7, at 91 n.199 (raising the issue of Garner’s presidential 
eligibility). 
 76 Id. 
 77 Because the Twelfth Amendment disqualifies for the Vice-Presidency any person “consti-
tutionally ineligible to the office of President,” the same constitutional issue over whether 
or not Garner was a natural born citizen was raised by virtue of Garner’s election to the 
Vice Presidency.  U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 78 These are the official dates of statehood for Alaska and Hawaii.  See Act of Mar. 18, 1959, 
Pub. L. No. 86-3, 73 Stat. 4; Act of July 7, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339; Proclama-
tion No. 3309, 24 Fed. Reg. 6868 (Aug. 25, 1959) (admitting Hawaii into the Union); 
Proclamation No. 3269, 24 Fed. Reg. 81 (Jan. 6, 1959) (admitting Alaska into the Union). 
 79 See Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 525 (1905) (holding that Alaska was an 
incorporated territory). 
 80 See Act of Apr. 30, 1900, ch. 339, 31 Stat. 141 (declaring Hawaii an incorporated territory 
after this date, and all of its citizens at the time of its acquisition by the United States on 
August 12, 1898, to be United States citizens). 
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gressional action.81  Because incorporation is a necessary and impor-
tant step in the path to statehood,82 Congress has been careful to ex-
tend incorporation only to those territories “destined for state-
hood.”83  Because of incorporation’s designation as a stepping stone 
for statehood, the Constitution applies in full force to incorporated 
territories, such as Alaska and Hawaii prior to statehood.84  Therefore, 
commentators have argued that it is likely that persons born in these 
territories that are destined for statehood subsequent to being desig-
nated as incorporated territories qualify as natural born citizens un-
der Article II, as well as birthright citizens within the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.85  Thus, whether a territory is “in the United 
States” within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment likely 
turns on Congressional intent with respect to that territory’s future 
statehood.86  This group includes Goldwater, Garner, and the afore-
mentioned citizens of Alaska and Hawaii.  Still, in the absence of an 
explicit ruling by the Supreme Court, the eligibility of such persons 
for the office of the presidency remains uncertain. 
2.  Persons Born to Americans Abroad 
Most of the debate surrounding the natural born proviso has fo-
cused on whether foreign-born children of citizen parents fall under 
the meaning of “natural born.”  This rekindles the discussion of 
whether the governing principle of “natural born” is jus soli or jus 
sanguinis.  If the former meaning applies, then foreign-born children 
of natural-born citizen parents do not qualify as natural-born; if the 
latter applies, then they do.  Congress’s first exercise of its naturaliza-
 
 81 See Rassmussen, 197 U.S. at 521 (holding that territory is usually incorporated by congres-
sional action, and in the case of acquiring a territory by treaty, the treaty is also impor-
tant); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 149 (1904) (holding that the Constitution did 
not require the right to trial by jury in the Philippines while it was a United States terri-
tory); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901) (holding that “Porto [sic] Rico is a ter-
ritory appurtenant and belonging to the United States, but not a part of the United States 
within the revenue clauses of the Constitution . . . .”). 
 82 See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 311 (1922) (“Incorporation has always been a step, 
and an important one, leading to statehood.”). 
 83 Smith v. Gov’t of the Virgin Islands, 375 F.2d 714, 718 (3d Cir. 1967). 
 84 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Puerto Rico and the Constitution:  Conundrums and Prospects, 11 
CONST. COMMENT. 15, 26 (1995) (“For those territories ‘incorporated’ into the United 
States by congressional and executive branch action and deemed to be on the road to 
statehood (such as Alaska), the Constitution applied in full.”). 
 85 See Duggin & Collins, supra note 7, at 92 (arguing for the inclusion of these groups under 
the meaning of natural born citizens as well as under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 86 Id. at 92 & n.206 (noting Congress’s plenary power over territories under Section 3 of 
Article IV of the Constitution). 
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tion powers—the Naturalization Act of 1790—followed the principle 
of jus sanguinis, providing that “the children of citizens of the United 
States, that may be born beyond sea . . . shall be considered as natural 
born citizens . . . .”87  Congress repealed the 1790 Act, however, in 
1795 and replaced it with legislation providing substantially the same 
provisions with one significant change—it stated that foreign-born 
children of citizen parents “shall be considered as citizens of the 
United States.”88  Thus, the new legislation omitted the characteriza-
tion of such children as “natural born.”  While there is no evidence 
explaining why the 1795 legislators omitted the natural born lan-
guage, the language has not since reappeared in any legislation con-
cerning citizenship.89  More recent legislation refers only to citizen-
ship at birth and by naturalization,90 much like the Court’s 
interpretation of the two means to citizenship.91  The Cabinet Com-
mittee—comprised of the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, 
and the Secretary of Labor92—whose five-year study was responsible 
for the Nationality Act of 1940 noted that the question of whether the 
Constitution’s language of “natural born citizens” includes foreign-
born children of citizens was “still a subject of debate.”93  But this 
Committee recognized the possibility that the Framers may have had 
a broader definition of “naturalization” in mind, which would have 
included the acquisition of citizenship at birth by foreign-born chil-
dren of citizens.94  Congress has since passed several statutes govern-
 
 87 Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 104. 
 88 Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, § 3, 1 Stat. 414, 415. 
 89 See Gordon, supra note 17, at 11 (noting that after removing the language from the Natu-
ralization Act of 1795, Congress has never reinserted the natural born language into its 
naturalization laws). 
 90 See Immigration and Nationality Acts, supra note 60.  See also Gordon, supra note 17, at 11 
(asserting that modern designations of citizenship refer only to citizenship by birth and 
by naturalization). 
 91 See cases cited supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 92 See Gordon, supra note 17, at 15 (quoting UNITED STATES COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE 
NATIONALITY LAWS, NATIONALITY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES:  MESSAGE FROM THE 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING A REPORT PROPOSING A REVISION AND 
CODIFICATION OF THE NATIONALITY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES vii (Comm. Print 1939) 
[hereinafter NATIONALITY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES]) (describing the evolution of 
citizenship and presidential eligibility in recent legislation, including the 1940 United 
States Code). 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 15 (quoting NATIONALITY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 92, at 3) (noting 
that while the Committee acknowledged this possibility of a broader meaning of “natu-
ralization,” it also recognized the “now universally” accepted meaning that naturalization 
encompassed citizenship after birth). 
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ing citizenship by birth abroad.95  As a general rule, the citizenship of 
foreign-born persons who claim derivative United States citizenship 
through certain familial relationships is governed by the statute in ef-
fect at the time of the person’s birth.96  Statutes conferring such citi-
zenship are construed prospectively only in application.97 
3.  African American Freedmen 
The status of African Americans has been a source of controversy 
since this nation’s founding.98  At the time of the Constitution’s adop-
tion, African Americans were citizens of several states.99  But in the 
Dred Scott case, the Supreme Court held that African Americans—
even those born free—were not citizens of the United States.100  The 
ruling of this case was short-lived, however, and was overruled by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Section 1 of this Amendment confirmed 
the principle of birthright citizenship and guaranteed the application 
of this principle to groups that had been previously excluded by 
Congress and the Courts, especially the descendants of slaves.101  In 
this way, the Fourteenth Amendment reaffirmed the principle of jus 
soli:   
 
 95 See DANIEL LEVY, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND NATURALIZATION HANDBOOK § 4:17 (Charles Roth 
ed. 2007) (listing in detail several statutes governing citizenship by birth abroad); see also 
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c)–(g) (2006) (granting 
derivative citizenship to all foreign-born children of an American parent, providing 
United States citizenship for children under five found in the United States with un-
known parentage, and incorporating predecessor statutes). 
 96 See Solis-Espinoza v. Gonzales, 401 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2005) (granting citizenship based 
on citizenship statute applicable when petitioner was born in 1967); Alcarez-Garcia v. 
Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that the applicable citizenship law for pe-
titioner born in 1952 was 8 U.S.C. § 601(g) (1940)); Scales v. INS, 232 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 
2000) (applying the citizenship statute of 1977 for petitioner born in that year). 
 97 See, e.g., Wolf v. Brownell, 253 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1957); Palomo v. Mitchell, 361 F. Supp. 
455 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff’d, 474 F.2d 1345 (5th Cir. 1973). 
 98 See PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT:  ILLEGAL 
ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY 66 (1985) (noting that the status of African Americans 
had been a subject of debate in the United States since at least the 1820s). 
 99 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 572–75 (1856) (Curtis, J., dissenting) 
(“At the time of the ratification of the Articles of Confederation, all free native-born in-
habitants of the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and 
North Carolina, though descended from African slaves, were not only citizens of those 
States, but such of them as had the other necessary qualifications possessed the franchise 
of electors, on equal terms with other citizens.”). 
100 Id. at 454 (holding that Dred Scott was not a citizen under the meaning of the term as 
used in the Constitution). 
101 See Pryor, supra note 32, at 881 n.2 (describing the application of jus soli to descendants of 
slaves through the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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The Fourteenth Amendment affirms the ancient and fundamental rule 
of citizenship by birth within the territory, in the allegiance and under 
the protection of the country, including all children here born of resi-
dent aliens, with the exceptions or qualifications (as old as the rule itself) 
of children of foreign sovereigns or their ministers . . . or of enemies 
within and during a hostile occupation of part of our territory . . . . The 
Amendment, in clear words and in manifest intent, includes the children 
born, within the territory of the United States, of all other persons, of 
whatever race or color, domiciled within the United States.102 
4.  Native Americans 
Before 1924, Native Americans could attain citizenship only by 
naturalization, treaty, or statute.103  The Supreme Court held that 
tribal Native Americans were not citizens within the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment because they were perceived “as owing im-
mediate political allegiance to their ancestral tribes,”104 and therefore 
“were not part of the people of the United States.”105  But a Congres-
sional statute passed in 1924 made all Native Americans born in the 
United States citizens.106  This statute has been extended to include 
Eskimos, Aleutians, and members of any other “aboriginal tribe.”107  
Through this statute, Native Americans are treated as are any other 
citizens for jurisdictional purposes.108  The Supreme Court held that 
 
102 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 693 (1898). 
103 See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 109 (1884) (holding that a Native American who had not 
been naturalized was not entitled to register to vote in Nebraska because Native Ameri-
cans do not acquire citizenship at birth even though they are born in the United States); 
see also United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 601 (1916) (holding that Congress alone had 
the power to dissolve tribal relations); Boyd v. Nebraska, 143 U.S. 135, 162 (1892) (hold-
ing that Native Americans in the state of Nebraska became United States citizens by stat-
ute); Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317, 330 (1892) (holding that, through a treaty, a Native 
American resident of Minnesota became a citizen of the United States). 
104 Jonathan C. Drimmer, The Nephews of Uncle Sam:  The History, Evolution, and Application of 
Birthright Citizenship in the United States, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 667, 699 (1995) (explaining 
why the Fourteenth Amendment had not previously applied to Native Americans). 
105 See Elk, 112 U.S. at 99. 
106 See The Indian Citizenship Act of June 2, 1924, Pub. L. No. 175, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 
(1924) (“That all non-citizen Indians born within the territorial limits of the United 
States be, and they are hereby, declared to be citizens of the United States:  Provided, That 
the granting of such citizenship shall not in any manner impair or otherwise affect the 
right of any Indian to tribal or other property.”). 
107 See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2006) (granting citizenship to “a person born in the United States 
to a member of an Indian, Eskimo, Aleutian, or other aboriginal tribe”). 
108 See Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6 (1956) (“Indians are citizens and . . . in ordinary 
affairs of life, [are] not governed by treaties or remedial legislation . . . .”); see also Poitra 
v. Demarrias, 502 F.2d 23 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 934 (1975) (ruling that Na-
tive Americans are citizens for diversity jurisdiction purposes); Ex parte Green, 123 F.2d 
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Native Americans who remain on tribal reservations are citizens of 
the state in which the reservation is located.109  Similarly, the Court 
ruled that a Native American who has left the reservation is a citizen 
of the state in which he or she is domiciled.110  It remains subject to 
debate, however, whether the 1924 statute extending citizenship to 
Native Americans confers “natural born” status to them, because the 
Supreme Court has never overruled its prior ruling that Native 
Americans are not citizens under the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
“the United States citizenship of many Native Americans purportedly 
arises from collective naturalization by statute rather than the Consti-
tution.”111 
5.  Persons Born in the District of Columbia 
The issue of presidential eligibility for citizens born in the District 
of Columbia revolves around the question of whether the District 
would be defined as “in the United States.”112  Congress, with a Con-
stitutional grant of authority,113 has never designated the District of 
Columbia as a state.114  The District also has never been defined as an 
unincorporated territory of the United States, and the Constitution 
therefore applies in full force to the District.115  Nevertheless, the Su-
preme Court has held that “[w]hether the District of Columbia con-
stitutes a ‘State or Territory’ within the meaning of any particu-
lar . . . constitutional provision depends upon the character and aim 
 
862, 864 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 668 (holding that Native Americans are citi-
zens for purposes of Selective Service Act). 
109 See Schantz v. White Lightning, 502 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding that where an action 
arose out of an accident on an Indian reservation, federal jurisdiction could not be based 
on diversity of citizenship when defendant Native Americans were members of tribes lo-
cated in North Dakota and plaintiff was resident of North Dakota residing outside the 
reservation). 
110 Id. 
111 See Duggin & Collins, supra note 7, at 102 (citing CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION 
LAW AND PROCEDURE § 92.03(3)(e) (2004)) (asserting that the natural born proviso “casts 
a shadow over the eligibility of at least some Native Americans to serve as Presi-
dent . . . .”). 
112 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  See also Duggin & Collins, supra note 7, at 89–90 (noting 
that, at a minimum, citizens born “in the United States” are considered natural born citi-
zens under the principle of birthright citizenship). 
113 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 
114 While several attempts at statehood have been advanced, e.g., S. 898, 103d Cong. (1993); 
H.R. 51, 103d Cong. (1993), Congress has never admitted the District of Columbia as a 
state. 
115 See Duggin & Collins, supra note 7, at 97 (describing the status of the District of Columbia 
and the presidential eligibility of citizens born in the District). 
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of the specific provision involved.”116  The Court has determined that 
the District of Columbia is not a state for purposes of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause,117 Congressional representa-
tion,118 or diversity jurisdiction pursuant to Article III.119  But residents 
of the District of Columbia are protected by the Due Process clause of 
the Fifth Amendment.120  The Supreme Court has never directly de-
cided whether a citizen born in the District of Columbia is a natural 
born citizen, prompting some commentators to view the status of 
such citizens and their eligibility for the presidency as uncertain.121  
Such a conclusion, however, seems to contradict the Supreme Court’s 
recognition of the District’s status.  As early as 1820, Chief Justice 
John Marshall stated:  “The district of Columbia . . . is not less within 
the United States, than Maryland or Pennsylvania . . . .”122  Therefore, 
it appears that citizens born in the District are as entitled to natural 
born status as those born in Maryland, Pennsylvania, or any other 
state in the Union. 
6.  Persons Born in United States Embassies, Military Bases, and Other 
Areas of Special Jurisdiction 
The Supreme Court has ruled that the territory subject to United 
States jurisdiction “includes the land areas under its dominion and 
control, the ports, harbors, bays and other enclosed arms of the sea 
along its coast and a marginal belt of the sea extending from the 
coast line outward a marine league, or three geographic miles.”123  
Congress has since extended the territorial waters to twelve nautical 
 
116 District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 420 (1973) (holding that the District of Co-
lumbia was not a “State or Territory” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
117 Id. at 424. 
118 Adams v. Clinton, 90 F. Supp. 2d 35, 50 (D.D.C. 2000) (“We conclude from our analysis 
of the text that the Constitution does not contemplate that the District may serve as a 
state for purposes of the apportionment of congressional representatives.”). 
119 Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 588 (1949) (holding that the 
District of Columbia was neither contemplated as a state nor admitted as a new state). 
120 See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding racial segregation in the District of 
Columbia’s public schools unconstitutional based on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment rather than the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which was applied in Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). 
121 See Duggin & Collins, supra note 7, at 98 (asserting that “a modicum of uncertainty re-
mains” over the presidential eligibility of citizens born in the District of Columbia). 
122 Loughborough v. Blake, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 317, 319, 325 (1920) (“Congress possesses, 
under the constitution, the power to lay and collect direct taxes within the District of Co-
lumbia . . . .”). 
123 Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 122 (1923). 
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miles from the baselines of the United States.124  Because territorial 
waters are considered an extension of the land, “whether a birth oc-
curs along the coast of Virginia or that of Puerto Rico could be sig-
nificant in determining whether a citizen is natural born.”125 
While it is generally assumed that anyone born in a United States 
embassy, consulate, or other installation (such as a military base) is a 
United States citizen at birth, such birth does not result in citizenship 
unless there is also another basis for citizenship.126  Similarly, while 
United States civilian and military vessels in international and foreign 
waters or airspace are subject to United States jurisdiction for several 
purposes, birth aboard these vessels does not in itself guarantee citi-
zenship.127  While at least two commentators have argued in favor of 
interpreting the status of children born of military personnel living 
abroad on active duty assignment as falling under the “natural born” 
umbrella, even this status remains ambiguous.128 
III.  NATIVE BORN PUERTO RICANS AND PRESIDENTIAL ELIGIBILITY 
Congress has defined “United States” in a geographical sense to 
mean “the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, 
Guam, and the Virgin Islands of the United States.”129  However, these 
entities are not all accorded the same legal status.  Under the Terri-
tory Clause of the Constitution, Congress has the power to regulate 
territories “belonging to the United States.”130  It is also “well estab-
lished that Congress possesses plenary power to legislate for territo-
ries acquired by purchase, conquest, treaty, or war.”131  The Court has 
 
124 See Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (Dec. 27, 1988). 
125 Duggin & Collins, supra note 7, at 102 & n.263 (arguing that because the legal principle 
of jus soli is based on actual physical presence, children born to aliens in international 
zones are arguably natural born United States citizens). 
126 See GORDON ET AL., supra note 111, at § 93.02(2)(d). 
127 See Lam Mow v. Nagle, 24 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1928) (holding that a person born to alien 
parents while aboard an American ship in foreign waters did not acquire United States 
citizenship at birth); see also Duggin & Collins, supra note 7, at 103 (citing Lam Mow). 
128 See Lohman, supra note 33, at 366 (“Thus, under both the common law and Wong Kim 
Ark, it appears that, at the very least, all foreign-born children of United States citizens, 
foreign-born as a direct result of parental government employment, are ‘within the alle-
giance’ of the United States at birth.  For example, this should encompass all children of 
United States military personnel, whether or not in enemy occupation of a foreign 
land.”); cf. Duggin & Collins, supra note 7, at 103 (endorsing Lohman’s interpretation, 
but acknowledging that the presidential eligibility of such children is ambiguous). 
129 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(38) (2006). 
130 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
131 Aleinikoff, supra note 84, at 17; see also Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 140 (1904) 
(finding “Congress possessing and exercising the absolute and undisputed power of gov-
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interpreted this power as granting Congress the ability to determine 
what parts of the Constitution, apart from these fundamental rights, 
will apply to each unincorporated territory.132  The inhabitants of un-
incorporated territories are not United States citizens until Congress 
chooses to grant United States citizenship to them, and only Congress 
has the power to determine upon what terms the United States will 
receive these inhabitants and what their status will be.133 
A.  Why Puerto Rico Merits Special Attention Among Unincorporated 
Territories 
There are several reasons why Puerto Rico ought to be considered 
a unique case among the unincorporated territories.134  With a popu-
lation of more than 3.8 million people,135 Puerto Rico is by far the 
 
erning and legislating” for territories (quoting Seré v. Pitot, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 332, 337 
(1810))). 
132 See Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 528 (1905) (holding that the Sixth 
Amendment applied to Alaska, an incorporated territory); Dorr, 195 U.S. at 149 (holding 
that the Sixth Amendment did not apply to the Philippines, an unincorporated territory); 
Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 215–18 (1903) (holding that the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments did not apply to Hawaii until it had been formally incorporated); Downes v. 
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 342 (1901) (White, J., concurring) (arguing that the uniformity 
clause of the Constitution was not applicable to Congress in legislating for Puerto Rico). 
133 See Rabang v. Boyd, 353 U.S. 427, 429 (1957) (noting that “‘. . . [t]he civil rights and po-
litical status of the native inhabitants . . . shall be determined by the Congress’” (quoting 
Treaty of Peace, supra note 143, art. IX, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754)). 
134 There are five remaining organized, unincorporated territories, all islands:  American 
Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.  
See THORNBURGH, supra note 26, at 11 (discussing U.S. policy toward unincorporated ter-
ritories).  Of these, Congress has designated American Samoa as an “outlying posses-
sion[] of the United States.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(29) (2006).  The citizens of these posses-
sions are not born United States citizens, but acquire noncitizen nationality at birth and 
may become citizens through an expedited naturalization process.  See Duggin & Collins, 
supra note 7, at 96 n.229 (“Residence as a national in American Samoa satisfies the per-
manent residency requirement for naturalization, and American Samoans can freely en-
ter the United States and become naturalized after three months.”).  There are also 
eleven small island territories, largely uninhabited, and unorganized:  Bajo Nuevo, Na-
vassa Island, and Serranilla Bank in the Caribbean Sea; and Baker Island, Howland Is-
land, Jarvis Island, Johnston Atoll, Kingman Reef, Midway Atoll, Palmyra Atoll, and Wake 
Atoll in the Pacific Ocean.  THORNBURGH, supra note 26, at 11, 32 n.10.  All of these are 
also unincorporated territories, except for Palmyra Atoll.  In addition to being the only 
existing incorporated territory, the Pacific island of Palmyra Atoll is also an unorganized 
territory with no indigenous population.  See U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of 
Insular Affairs, Definitions of Insular Area Political Organizations, http://www.doi.gov/
oia/Islandpages/political_types.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2009) (defining “incorporated 
territory” and “unorganized territory”). 
135 U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Data for Puerto Rico, http://www.census.gov/census
2000/states/pr.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2009). 
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largest unincorporated territory of the United States—larger than the 
populations of American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Is-
lands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands combined.136  Puerto Rico’s popula-
tion also rivals that of many states; if Puerto Rico ever achieved state-
hood, it would be the twenty-fifth most populous state in the Union 
and would send about half a dozen representatives to the House in 
addition to two senators.137  There are also more than 3.4 million per-
sons of Puerto Rican descent living in the continental United States, 
comprising about 1.2% of the nation’s population.138  This reflects 
not only the close social, political, and cultural ties between both the 
United States proper and the island, but also the fact that the issue’s 
salience reaches a constituency beyond Puerto Rico itself. 
The ties between Puerto Rico and the United States are further 
evidenced by the two countries’ financial and strategic ties.  Federal 
aid is critical to the health of the Puerto Rican economy.  The current 
federal subsidy of the Puerto Rican commonwealth is estimated at 
$16 billion annually and growing.139  In return, Puerto Rico provides 
the United States with an important military and strategic foothold in 
the Caribbean.140  Puerto Ricans served in the U.S. military in all of 
American’s wars in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries,141 and 
Puerto Rico ranks alongside the top five states in the Union in per 
capita military service.142 
Puerto Rico’s historical relationship with the United States pre-
sents a unique case unlike that of any other state already admitted 
into the Union or any other territory not yet admitted.  Over a cen-
tury ago, the United States Congress agreed to determine the “civil 
 
136 The combined population of American Samoa (population 57,291), Guam (population 
154,805), the Northern Mariana Islands (population 69,221), and the U.S. Virgin Islands 
(population 108,612) is 389,929.  See U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Results for the Is-
land Areas, http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/islandareas/index.html 
(last visited Jan. 15, 2009). 
137 Aleinikoff, supra note 84, at 15. 
138 U.S. Summary:  2000, Census 2000 Profile 2 (2002), http://www.census.gov/prod/2002
pubs/c2kprof00-us.pdf. 
139 THORNBURGH, supra note 26, at 6, 7 n.4 (citing other estimates that place the subsidy as 
high as $22 billion annually). 
140 Id. at 6 (noting that Puerto Rico was once home to the largest U.S. military base in the 
world at Roosevelt Roads, which could be reactivated in the future if needed). 
141 See George H. W. Bush, Foreword to THORNBURGH, supra note 26, at viii (“In particular, 
Puerto Ricans have fought bravely in all of America’s wars in the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries.”). 
142 THORNBURGH, supra note 26, at 6. 
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rights and political status” of Puerto Rican residents.143  Yet today, 
their rights and status are as ambiguous as ever.  Ninety years after 
Congress conferred U.S. citizenship to the residents of Puerto Rico, 
the island remains the only large and populous U.S. territory that has 
never been placed on the path to either statehood or independ-
ence.144 
Finally, Puerto Rico has generated the bulk of litigation concern-
ing the status of territories and the rights of their citizens, due in 
large part to the salience of the issue of Puerto Rico’s status among its 
citizens.145  Therefore, while Puerto Rico serves as a good lens 
through which to analyze the legal status and presidential eligibility 
of citizens of other territories, it presents an original and fascinating 
case study in its own right. 
B.  Acquisition from Spain 
Territorial policy substantially deviated from the Northwest Ordi-
nance policy of incorporation after the Spanish-American War, when 
the United States acquired sovereignty or control over Cuba, Guam, 
the Philippines, and Puerto Rico under the Treaty of Paris, signed 
with Spain on December 10, 1898.146 
Under this treaty, Spanish subjects born and residing in Puerto 
Rico had the choice to either remain subjects of the Spanish crown or 
be granted U.S. nationality.147  All other Spanish nationals residing in 
 
143 See Treaty of Peace, U.S.–Spain, art. IX, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754 (“The civil rights and 
political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United 
States shall be determined by the Congress.”). 
144 See THORNBURGH, supra note 26, at 5 (noting that Alaska and Hawaii were the last large 
territories admitted into the Union as states). 
145 See Smith, supra note 28, at 271 (noting the high voter turnout—over 70%—in the last 
two referenda over Puerto Rico’s status). 
146 THORNBURGH, supra note 26, at 10 (stating that federal territorial policies and practices 
deviated in earnest following the Spanish-American War); see also Treaty of Peace, supra 
note 143, art. I–III (stating that Spain relinquished “claim of sovereignty over and title to 
Cuba,” and “cedes to the United States” Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines). 
147 See Treaty of Peace, supra note 143, art. IX (“Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, 
residing in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her 
sovereignty . . . . may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a 
court of record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, 
a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration 
they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the terri-
tory in which they may reside.”). 
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Puerto Rico automatically became United States nationals at the time 
of the treaty’s ratification.148 
Article IX of the treaty, consistent with the Territorial Clause,149 
stated that the “civil rights and political status of the native inhabi-
tants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be de-
termined by the Congress.”150  But unlike the federal treatment of the 
territories acquired by westward expansion, including Alaska and 
Hawaii, congressional action that followed did not make these terri-
tories part of the United States.151  As a result, the Citizenship Clause 
of the Constitution did not apply to the inhabitants of Puerto Rico or 
any of these territories at the time of their acquisition by the United 
States.152  Prior to the Treaty of Paris, “[e]very treaty by which territory 
was ceded to the United States . . . contained some provision whereby 
either all or some of the inhabitants of the ceded territory could, ei-
ther immediately or ultimately, be admitted to United States citizen-
ship.”153  This marked the first time in American history that, “in a 
treaty acquiring territory for the United States, there was no promise 
of citizenship . . . . [nor any] promise, actual or implied, of statehood.  
The United States thereby acquired not ‘territories’ but possessions 
or ‘dependencies’ and became, in that sense, an ‘imperial’ power.”154 
C.  Congressional Policy Towards Puerto Rico and Judicial Interpretation 
Following the Treaty of Paris, congressional action towards Puerto 
Rico has been marked by the passage of a series of “organic” laws, 
similar to those passed for other “organized” territories, aimed at 
enabling the residents of the island to establish local rule consistent 
with and subject to federal law.155  Congress passed the first of these 
organic laws, the Foraker Act, in 1900 in order to establish a tempo-
 
148 See id.  See also LEVY, supra note 95, § 2:16 n.4 (citing an Immigration and Naturalization 
Services interpretation of the treaty as not allowing these other subjects to retain Spanish 
nationality). 
149 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
150 Treaty of Peace, supra note 143, art. IX. 
151 See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 304–05 (1922) (noting that Downes v. Bidwell had 
made settled law the fact “that neither the Philippines nor Porto Rico was territory which 
had been incorporated in the Union or become a part of the United States, as distin-
guished from merely belonging to it”). 
152 LEVY, supra note 95, at § 2:16. 
153 LUELLA GETTYS, THE LAW OF CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 144–45 (1934). 
154 JULIUS W. PRATT, AMERICA’S COLONIAL EXPERIMENT:  HOW THE UNITED STATES GAINED, 
GOVERNED, AND IN PART GAVE AWAY A COLONIAL EMPIRE 68 (1950). 
155 See THORNBURGH, supra note 26, at 11 (describing the nature of the organic laws). 
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rary civil government of the island.156  The Foraker Act established the 
office of Puerto Rico’s resident commissioner, a non-voting member 
of the U.S. House of Representatives with a four-year term.157  Under 
this Act, Congress retained the power to annul any laws enacted by 
this legislature.158  Congress also granted Puerto Rican citizenship to 
all former Spanish subjects residing in Puerto Rico since the treaty’s 
ratification.159 
A year after passing the Foraker Act, the Supreme Court issued 
the first in a series of decisions known as the Insular Cases.160  In these 
cases, the Supreme Court held that Congress had the power to create 
unincorporated territories.161  The Court distinguished these from in-
corporated territories by holding that the latter are intended for 
statehood from the time of acquisition and have the entire Constitu-
tion applied to them in full force.162  Unincorporated territories, on 
the other hand, were not incorporated in the tradition of the North-
west Ordinance and not intended for statehood, and in these territo-
 
156 Foraker Act, ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77 (1900) (repealed 1917). 
157 See id. § 39 (describing the position of the resident commissioner of Puerto Rico).  See also 
48 U.S.C. § 891 (2006) (setting the term of the resident commissioner to four years). 
158 Foraker Act, supra note 156, § 31. 
159 Id. § 7. See also LEVY, supra note 95, § 2:16 n.5 (noting that under this Act, Congress ex-
tended United States citizenship to former Spanish subjects only). 
160 See Smith, supra note 28, at 268 n.72 (providing the full list of Insular Cases, which in-
clude:  De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151 
(1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 
U.S. 243 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Huus v. New York & Porto Rico 
S.S. Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901); The Diamond Rings, 183 U.S. 176 (1901); Hawaii v. Manki-
chi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1 (1904); Kepner v. United 
States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Rassmussen v. 
United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905); Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521 (1905); Dowdell 
v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914); and 
Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922)); but see Duggin & Collins, supra note 7, at 93 
n.212 (noting that some scholars limit the series to the original 1901 cases, while others 
extend the canon to include between twenty-three and twenty-eight Supreme Court deci-
sions through 1922, ending with Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922)); see also José A. 
Cabranes, Citizenship and the American Empire, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 391, 419 n.97 (1979) (lim-
iting the canon of Insular Cases to the first four of its kind in 1901). 
161 See Dorr, 195 U.S. at 149 (“We conclude that the power to govern territory, implied in the 
right to acquire it, and given to Congress in the Constitution in Article IV, § 3 . . . does 
not require that body to enact for ceded territory, not made a part of the United States by 
Congressional action, a system of laws which shall include the right of trial by jury, and 
that the Constitution does not, without legislation and of its own force, carry such right to 
territory so situated.”). 
162 See Rassmussen, 197 U.S. at 528 (holding that the Constitution applied in full force to 
Alaska, an incorporated territory). 
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ries only fundamental rights apply by their own force.163  In Downes v. 
Bidwell, the Supreme Court held that Puerto Rico was “a territory ap-
purtenant and belonging to . . . but not a part of the United States 
within [certain provisions] of the Constitution.”164  This departure 
from the territorial policy of the Northwest Ordinance was justified, 
in part, because the territories acquired from Spain were “inhabited 
by alien races, differing from us in religion, customs, laws, methods of 
taxation and modes of thought” and therefore “the administration of 
government and justice, according to Anglo-Saxon principles, may 
for a time be impossible.”165 
In Gonzales v. Williams, the Supreme Court ruled that native-born 
Puerto Ricans who came to the mainland United States were neither 
aliens nor immigrants.166  Instead, the Court carved out a new status 
for these residents “who live in the peace of the dominion of the 
United States”167 and left the future of their “civil rights and political 
status”168 to the discretion of Congress.169 
Congress increased local authority over the administration of civil 
government and, more importantly, conferred statutory citizenship to 
all citizens in Puerto Rico through the Jones Act of 1917.170  One of 
the primary motivations for extending citizenship to Puerto Ricans 
under the Jones Act was to proclaim “‘the future of Puerto Rico to be 
something other than national independence,’ while denying that 
citizenship entailed an immediate eventual offer of statehood.”171  
Thus, in granting citizenship to Puerto Ricans, Congress did not in-
tend to expand their rights, nor did it demonstrate congressional in-
 
163 See Examining Bd. of Eng’rs, Architects and Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 
599 n.30 (1976) (noting that the unincorporated territories “included those Territories 
not possessing that anticipation of statehood.  As to them, only ‘fundamental’ constitu-
tional rights were guaranteed to the inhabitants”). 
164 Downes, 182 U.S. at 287. 
165 Id. 
166 Gonzales, 192 U.S. at 13. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 9 (citing Treaty of Peace, supra note 143, art. IX). 
169 See THORNBURGH, supra note 26, at 49 (stating that through the Gonzales decision, the Su-
preme Court invented a new class of persons). 
170 Jones Act, Act of March 2, 1917, Ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951.  The Jones Act is also known as the 
Organic Act of 1917. 
171 Eduardo Guzmán, Note, Igartúa de la Rosa v. United States:  The Right of the United States 
Citizens of Puerto Rico to Vote for the President and the Need to Re-evaluate America’s Territorial 
Policy, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 141, 154 (2001) (citing JOSÉ A. CABRANES, CITIZENSHIP AND 
THE AMERICAN EMPIRE 6 (1979)). 
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tent to incorporate the territory into the United States.172  Puerto Ri-
cans born on the island after the passage of the Act, however, did not 
become United States citizens at birth as a result of the Jones Act.173  
Congress did not extend citizenship at birth to all persons born in 
Puerto Rico until 1934.174  Because members of Congress did not be-
lieve that residents of Puerto Rico were capable of self-government, 
the increases in self-government granted by the Jones Act were coun-
terbalanced by other restrictions.175  Like the Foraker Act before it, 
the Jones Act “carefully avoided” any language concerning Puerto 
Rico’s relationship to the United States.176 
Five years later, in Balzac v. Porto Rico, the Supreme Court ruled 
that the extension of citizenship to Puerto Ricans neither incorpo-
rated the territory into the United States nor granted its citizens more 
rights than were conferred in the Foraker and Jones Acts.177  The 
Court concluded that the unincorporated status of Puerto Rico 
handed down by the Insular Cases was clear by 1917, and the Court 
found no congressional action in the Jones Act that would change 
that fact.178  The Court stated that “[i]ncorporation has always been a 
step, and an important one, leading to statehood” and, therefore, “it 
is reasonable to assume that when such a step is taken it will be begun 
and taken by Congress deliberately and with a clear declaration of 
purpose, and not left a matter of mere inference or construction.”179  
In this way, the Court held that the status and rights of Puerto Ri-
cans—and other U.S. citizens of incorporated territories—had to be 
explicitly determined by Congress through its territorial powers and 
 
172 Id. at 153–54 (discussing congressional intent in granting citizenship to residents of 
Puerto Rico). 
173 See Conrad v. Dulles, 155 F. Supp. 542, 543 (D.P.R. 1957) (noting that the Jones Act did 
not confer citizenship status at birth to a native-born Puerto Rican born after the Jones 
Act in 1901 and before 1934). 
174 See Act of June 27, 1934, ch. 845, 48 Stat. 1245 (extending United States citizenship to 
Puerto Ricans born after April 11, 1899). 
175 See HENRY WELLS, THE MODERNIZATION OF PUERTO RICO:  A POLITICAL STUDY OF 
CHANGING VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 85 (1969) (“Such increased authority as it did be-
stow, it counter-balanced in part with new controls.”). 
176 Id. 
177 See 258 U.S. 298, 306 (1922) (“The act is entitled ‘An Act To provide a civil government 
for Porto Rico, and for other purposes.’  It does not indicate by its title that it has a pur-
pose to incorporate the Island into the Union.  It does not contain any clause which de-
clares such purpose or effect.  While this is not conclusive, it strongly tends to show that 
Congress did not have such an intention.”). 
178 See id. at 304–13 (concluding that Congress did not, through the Jones Act, incorporate 
Puerto Rico or set it on the path towards incorporation); THORNBURGH, supra note 26, at 
51 (explaining the Court’s interpretation of the Jones Act in Balzac). 
179 Balzac, 258 U.S. at 311. 
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were not defined by direct application of the Constitution.180  The 
only limit on this power was that Congressional territorial policy 
should not violate “certain fundamental personal rights declared in 
the Constitution.”181 
This case has been the subject of criticism,182 in large part because 
it is difficult to reconcile with the Court’s previous holding in Rass-
mussen v. United States.183  There, the Court inferred intent to incorpo-
rate Alaska based on Congressional conferral of citizenship to Alas-
kan residents.184  Yet in Balzac, the Court came to the exact opposite 
conclusion after Congress had conferred citizenship to the residents 
of Puerto Rico—requiring that there be a “declaration of purpose” by 
Congress in order to find intent to incorporate the territory.185  Nev-
ertheless, this insistence that Congress explicitly declare its purpose 
to incorporate Puerto Rico—and the fact that it has yet to do so after 
a century of United States control of Puerto Rico—has controlled the 
status of native-born Puerto Ricans ever since. 
In 1950, Congress continued its legislation to promote increased 
home rule for Puerto Rico by passing Public Law 600.186  This law al-
lowed residents of Puerto Rico to adopt a local constitution, subject 
to Congressional approval, for internal civil affairs, thus creating a 
process for joint approval.187  Pursuant to Public Law 600, Puerto Rico 
held a referendum on whether to organize a government centered 
on commonwealth status as well as a constitutional convention, which 
would then be subjected to Congressional approval.188  Under this 
proposed commonwealth, however, the legal and political relation-
ship between Puerto Rico and the United States was to remain largely 
unchanged from that which had existed since 1917.189  This is because 
 
180 See THORNBURGH, supra note 26, at 52 (interpreting the implications of the Court’s deci-
sion in Balzac). 
181 Id. (citing Balzac, 258 U.S. at 312–13). 
182 See id. (“The conspicuous deficiencies in this controlling jurisprudence cannot be sus-
tained upon serious scrutiny, yet the destiny of the U.S. citizens of Puerto Rico has been 
determined for eight decades based on the flawed logic and mind-bending cognitive dis-
sonance of this misconceived ruling.”). 
183 197 U.S. 516 (1905). 
184 See id. at 522 (“This declaration . . . is the equivalent . . . of the formula employed from 
the beginning to express the purpose to incorporate acquired territory into the United 
States, especially in the absence of other provisions showing an intention to the con-
trary.”). 
185 Balzac, 258 U.S. at 311. 
186 Act of July 3, 1950, Pub. L. No. 600, ch. 446, 64 Stat. 319. 
187 Id. 
188 See id. 
189 WELLS, supra note 175, at 233. 
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Public Law 600 provided for a partial repeal of the Jones Act, with the 
rest of the 1917 act to stay in effect under a new statute, the Puerto 
Rican Federal Relations Act.190  The remaining provisions of the Jones 
Act that were to be incorporated into the new statute pertained to 
Puerto Rico’s relationship with the United States.191  Thus, the Puerto 
Rican Federal Relations Act, as the amended Jones Act would be 
known, was to keep in effect the relationship between Puerto Rico 
and the United States established by the Jones Act and interpreted by 
the Court in Balzac. 
Nevertheless, on June 4, 1951, 76.5% of Puerto Ricans approved 
Public Law 600 and voted in favor of “permanent association” with 
the United States in the form of commonwealth status.192  After ac-
cepting Congressional amendments to the draft of the proposed con-
stitution of Puerto Rico,193 the Puerto Rican constitutional convention 
amended its Constitution in accordance with the congressional man-
date, and the constitution formally took effect on July 25, 1952, estab-
lishing commonwealth status for Puerto Rico.194  That same year, the 
citizenship status of Puerto Ricans was bolstered by the Immigration 
and Nationality Act of 1952, which made every person born in Puerto 
Rico a statutory citizen of the United States at birth.195 
Though some have suggested that establishing commonwealth 
status in Puerto Rico ended Congress’s plenary power under the Ter-
ritory Clause,196 both the Supreme Court and the Executive Branch 
have rejected this view.197  Thus, since the establishment of common-
 
190 See WELLS, supra note 175, at 232 (detailing the fourth and fifth sections of Public Law 
600, which partially repealed the Jones Act). 
191 Id. 
192 Smith, supra note 28, at 269. 
193 See THORNBURGH, supra note 26, at 16 (stating that Congress approved the local constitu-
tion draft, subject to certain amendments, on July 3, 1952); Aleinikoff, supra note 84, at 
18 & nn.13, 14 (noting Congress’s rejection of “positive rights” in the Puerto Rican con-
stitution and the addition of an education proviso). 
194 Aleinikoff, supra note 84, at 19 (describing the final stages of adoption for the Puerto Ri-
can Constitution and the beginning of commonwealth status for the island). 
195 See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended 
at 8 U.S.C. § 1402 (2006)) (“All persons born in Puerto Rico on or after January 13, 1941, 
and subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, are citizens of the United States at 
birth.”). 
196 See Aleinikoff, supra note 84, at 19 (“Under this reasoning, Congress lost general power to 
regulate the internal affairs of Puerto Rico or to amend the ‘compact’ without Puerto Ri-
can consent—much as Congress has no power to legislate for the now-independent Phil-
ippines or territories that have become states.”). 
197 See Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 651–52 (1980) (per curiam) (citing Califano v. Torres, 
435 U.S. 1 (1978)) (“Congress, which is empowered under the Territory Clause of the 
Constitution, to ‘make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Terri-
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wealth status more than half a century ago—and arguably, since the 
Jones Act of 1917—nothing has changed with regard to the status of 
Puerto Rico’s relationship to the United States,198 or the citizenship 
status of native-born Puerto Ricans. 
D.  Presidential Ineligibility of Native-Born Puerto Ricans 
In order to qualify as natural born citizens, native-born Puerto Ri-
cans would have to establish a right through the principle of jus soli.199  
Having examined the Congressional treatment of Puerto Rico and its 
citizens through Congress’s territorial incorporation and naturaliza-
tion powers, and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of that legisla-
tion, this Comment concludes that native-born Puerto Ricans do not, 
by virtue of their birthplace,200 qualify as natural born citizens and are 
therefore ineligible for the office of the presidency under Article II of 
the Constitution. 
 
tory . . . belonging to the United States,’ may treat Puerto Rico differently from States so 
long as there is a rational basis for its actions.”); Political Status of Puerto Rico, 1991:  Hear-
ings on S. 244 Before the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 
193–94 (1991) (statement of Hon. Richard Thornburgh, Attorney General) (“We also 
have concerns with some of the provisions that define the commonwealth option.  For 
example, Section 402(a) would declare that Puerto Rico ‘enjoys sovereignty, like a state, 
to the extent provided by the Tenth Amendment,’ and that ‘[t]his relationship is perma-
nent unless revoked by mutual consent.’  These declarations are totally inconsistent with 
the Constitution.”). 
198 Since the referendum of 1951 endorsing commonwealth status, three other referenda 
have been held on the status of Puerto Rico.  On July 23, 1967, a second referendum of-
fered three options to Puerto Ricans:  60.5% voted for commonwealth status, 38.9% voted 
for statehood, and 0.6% voted for independence.  Smith, supra note 28, at 270.  Two ref-
erenda were introduced in the 1990s.  On November 14, 1993, 48.6% of Puerto Ricans 
voted for commonwealth status, 46.3% voted for statehood, and 4.4% voted for inde-
pendence.  Id.  Finally, on December 13, 1998, a fourth option was introduced—the “As-
sociated Republic,” a status meaning something “less autonomous than independence 
but more than commonwealth status.”  Id. at 271.  But because the ballot described com-
monwealth status as “the colonial option,” commonwealth proponents protested by en-
couraging voters to choose none of the options.  Id.  As a result, 50.3% of voters chose 
“none of the above,” 46.5% chose statehood, 2.5% chose independence, and 0.1% chose 
commonwealth status.  Id.  While none of these votes were binding on Congress, the last 
two votes in the 1990s drew voter turnout of 73.5% and 71.3%, respectfully.  Id.  This 
demonstrates the level of interest Puerto Ricans have in the question of their island’s po-
litical status. 
199 See Part I.B., supra (discussing why the only claim to natural born status for native-born 
Puerto Ricans is through the principle of jus soli). 
200 If persons born in Puerto Rico have an alternative claim to natural born status—such as 
right by jus sanguinis—then they may be eligible for the presidency, but birthplace alone 
does not make these citizens eligible. 
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First, persons born in Puerto Rico cannot claim natural born citi-
zenship through the common law principle of jus soli because Puerto 
Rico, as an unincorporated territory, was not made part of the United 
States in the fullest sense.201  Nothing in the congressional acts gov-
erning Puerto Rico—not even establishing commonwealth rule—has 
so fundamentally changed its status as to negate the fact that it still 
has not yet been fully incorporated by the United States.202  This un-
incorporated status of Puerto Rico is crucial to understanding that 
the territory does not qualify as United States soil for purposes of de-
termining natural born citizenship through jus soli because this status 
signaled “an implied denial of the rights of the inhabitants to Ameri-
can citizenship until Congress by further action shall signify its assent 
thereto.”203  The Supreme Court has upheld the disparate treatment 
of Puerto Ricans from citizens of the states, ruling that under the 
Territory Clause Congress “may treat Puerto Rico differently from 
States so long as there is a rational basis for its actions.”204  What 
makes this disparate treatment permissible is not simply that there is 
a rational justification for the different treatment—there may be ra-
tional reasons to treat citizens of different states differently, but that 
is impermissible.  Rather, what makes the disparate treatment of 
Puerto Rico and its residents permissible is residence in a territory—
“the status of place.”205  It is for this same reason—a difference in 
status of place—that residents of Puerto Rico do not have the right to 
vote in presidential elections.206  The courts have held that in the 
Electoral College system, the right to vote for presidential electors 
applies only to the states and the District of Columbia.207  Since 
 
201 See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312–13 (1922) (holding that the right to trial by 
jury was not “fundamental”); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 291, 294 (White, Shiras, 
and McKenna, JJ., concurring) (1901) (holding that fundamental rights apply in unin-
corporated territories). 
202 See Aleinikoff, supra note 84, at 19. 
203 Downes, 182 U.S. at 280. 
204 Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 651–52 (1980). 
205 See Aleinikoff, supra note 84, at 24 (arguing that Harris exposes the deeper issue of status 
of place as determining the disparate treatment of Puerto Rico from states). 
206 Nelson D. Hermilla, Puerto Rico 1898–1998:  The Institutionalization of Second Class Citizen-
ship?, 16 DICK. J. INT’L L. 275, 297 (1998); Ezequiel Lugo, The Unfinished Business of Ameri-
can Democracy, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 871, 872 (2007).  Since 1980, however, Puerto Ricans 
have participated in presidential primaries.  See Hermilla, supra, at 284 n.29. 
207 See Igartúa de la Rosa v. United States, 229 F.3d 80, 83–84 (1st Cir. 2000) (ruling that the 
right to vote for presidential electors through the Electoral College was reserved for the 
states and the District of Columbia, and that Puerto Rico is not a state within the meaning 
of the U.S. Constitution). 
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Puerto Rico is not a state under the Constitution,208 and has not been 
granted electors via a constitutional amendment as in the case of the 
District of Columbia,209 it is not entitled to presidential electors and 
citizens of Puerto Rico therefore have no constitutional right to vote 
in presidential elections.210  Oddly enough, although United States 
citizens retain their voting rights in presidential elections when they 
move to foreign countries,211 they lose that same right to vote if they 
move to Puerto Rico.212  Thus, Puerto Rico does not have what states 
do—formal congressional representation, votes in the Electoral Col-
lege, and, most importantly, the status that entails full rights for its 
residents. 
If birth in Puerto Rico, as a United States territory, granted a per-
son natural born citizenship, it would not have taken a federal statute 
to extend citizenship to residents of and persons born in Puerto Rico.  
Furthermore, if Congress, through its powers under the Territorial 
Clause,213 decided to revoke the extension of citizenship to Puerto Ri-
cans, then surely persons thereafter born on the island would have no 
jus soli claims—even though the territory still belonged to the United 
States, because only natural born citizens are eligible for the presi-
dency.  This illustrates that, even with the extension of statutory citi-
zenship, birthplace in Puerto Rico does not provide natural born citi-
 
208 See Igartúa de la Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 147 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 547 U.S. 1035 (2006) (mem.) (citing Trailer Marine Transp. Corp. v. Rivera 
Vazquez, 977 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1992)) (stating that Puerto Rico is not a state within the 
meaning of the Constitution). 
209 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, § 1 (“The District constituting the seat of Government of 
the United States shall appoint in such manner as the Congress may direct:  A number of 
electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number of Senators and Rep-
resentatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it were a State, but in no 
event more than the least populous State . . . .”). 
210 Igartúa, 417 F.3d at 147 (“As Puerto Rico has no electors, its citizens do not participate in 
the presidential voting, although they may do so if they take up residence in one of the 50 
states . . . .”). 
211 See Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (“UOCAVA”), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973ff-1(3) (2006). See also Igartúa de la Rosa v. United States (Igartúa I), 32 F.3d 8, 10 
(1st Cir. 1994) (interpreting UOCAVA to protect the voting rights of citizens who tempo-
rarily reside overseas), aff’d, 417 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 
1035 (2006). 
212 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ff-2(b)(1), 1973ff-6(8).  See also Igartúa I, 32 F.3d at 10 (asserting that 
UOCAVA did not guarantee that a citizen moving to Puerto Rico will be eligible to vote 
in a presidential election); Romeu v. Cohen, 265 F.3d 118, 124 (2d. Cir. 2001) (holding 
that UOCAVA did not violate the Equal Protection clause by providing presidential vot-
ing rights to former residents of a state currently residing outside the United States, but 
not to former residents of a state currently residing in Puerto Rico). 
213 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
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zenship—and presidential eligibility—through jus soli because of 
Puerto Rico’s unincorporated status. 
Second, the citizenship enjoyed by native-born Puerto Ricans, 
which is statutorily protected, does not have the same meaning as or 
consequence of natural-born citizenship, which is constitutionally 
protected.214  Natural-born citizens enjoy the full protection and 
rights of the Constitution.  Natural-born citizenship also entails a le-
gal and political permanence—once a right to natural born citizen-
ship is established under the Constitution, it cannot be stripped away. 
The same permanence and scope of rights and benefits afforded 
to natural born citizens are not shared by Puerto Rican citizens.  In a 
variety of circumstances, Congress continues to treat Puerto Rico and 
its residents, native-born and otherwise, differently than it treats states 
and their residents.215  Through its territorial powers,216 Congress can, 
in its discretion, choose to apply or refrain from applying the Consti-
tution, federal treaty, or federal statutes to Puerto Rico.  Extending 
citizenship to residents of Puerto Rico, however, did not also extend 
the full protections and rights of the Constitution to those resi-
dents.217  Federal courts will uphold the application of those laws 
while they remain in effect.218  But because no Congress can restrict 
the power of any future Congress to amend or nullify a statute,219 any 
such statute—including the extension of citizenship—cannot be 
guaranteed as territorial policy in the future.  “What Congress has 
granted . . . it may always take away.”220  It follows that equating statu-
tory citizenship with natural born citizenship could quite plausibly 
lead to the Natural Born Citizen Clause having one meaning today 
and quite another tomorrow, all at the whim of Congress.  This would 
violate the bright-line meaning the Framers intended the natural 
 
214 THORNBURGH, supra note 26, at 55 (noting, in light of constitutionally protected citizen-
ship versus statutory citizenship, the differences between congressionally granted statu-
tory rights and constitutional rights). 
215 See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 84, at 21 & n.19 (describing several ways in which Congress 
treats Puerto Rico differently from states for purposes of federal benefits). 
216 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
217 Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312–13 (1922) (explaining that some of the grants of 
power and limitations in the Constitution are not always and everywhere applicable). 
218 THORNBURGH, supra note 26, at 55 (“[F]ederal courts will uphold statutes creating local 
government structures in the territories as long as the statutes creating those structures 
remain in effect and unaltered by federal law.”). 
219 Id. at 55, 60 n.44. 
220 Aleinikoff, supra note 84, at 17. 
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born clause to have.221  Therefore, the temporary nature of the statu-
tory citizenship that native-born Puerto Ricans enjoy lacks both the 
scope and permanence of the legal and political rights of natural 
born citizenship.222 
Thus, this Comment concludes that native-born Puerto Ricans 
have no right to natural born status through jus soli for two related 
reasons:  neither the status of the unincorporated territory in which 
they are born nor the legal or political status they are granted as 
statutory citizens has the scope or permanence of Constitutional 
rights and privileges associated with natural born citizenship. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
While the question of who qualifies for presidential eligibility un-
der the natural born proviso of Article II, Section 1, clause 5 presents 
a fascinating issue on a theoretical level, the case of native-born 
Puerto Ricans illustrates that the issue has a real-life impact as well.  
There appear to be two ways to make these persons eligible for the 
office of the presidency.  First, Congress could pass a constitutional 
amendment that clarifies the definition of “natural born citizen” to 
include persons born in Puerto Rico.223  Second, Congress could fully 
incorporate Puerto Rico into the Union, designating the territory as 
destined for statehood and its citizens natural born by virtue of being 
born within the United States in the fullest sense.  This Comment 
now considers the implications of presidential ineligibility for citizens 
of Puerto Rico and other United States territories. 
Without question, “eligibility for [the] office alone promotes de-
mocratic values separate and apart from actual service in office.”224  It 
is therefore understandable that preclusion from the office of the 
presidency for certain persons who at their birth are citizens of this 
country leads to discontent and sentiments of second-class citizen-
ship.225  But those sentiments are likely to exist regardless of whether 
 
221 See Pryor, supra note 32, at 895 (suggesting that the Framers intended for “natural born” 
to be a bright-line rule, much like the age and residency requirements of presidential eli-
gibility). 
222 THORNBURGH, supra note 26, at 55. 
223 It is beyond the scope of this Comment to suggest what would be the best wording for 
such a proposed constitutional amendment. 
224 Ho, supra note 23, at 576. 
225 See, e.g., Cabranes, supra note 160, at 492 (concluding that Congress extended second 
class citizenship to Puerto Ricans and created an anomalous situation that has lasted ever 
since); Guzman, supra note 171, at 182 (claiming that the current policy towards Puerto 
Rico and its residents “creates second class citizens”); Hermilla, supra note 206, at 278 
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or not native-born Puerto Ricans are deemed eligible to run for the 
presidency by virtue of the many other ways in which citizenship in 
Puerto Rico has a different legal and political meaning than citizen-
ship in any one of the fifty states in the Union.226 
Thus, to the extent that the current political and legal status of 
the island is the root of the problem,227 and to the extent that citizens 
of Puerto Rico are dissatisfied with that status,228 making native-born 
citizens of Puerto Rico eligible to run for the presidency will not fix 
the problem.  In fact, it will likely exacerbate it.  With each small po-
litical gain citizens of the island receive, the less dissatisfied with the 
current status of the island and the less motivated they will be to mo-
bilize and vote for change at the polls—whether that change be 
statehood or independence.  Therefore, if one views Puerto Rico’s 
status as an unincorporated territory with commonwealth status as an 
obstacle to full citizenship, extending eligibility to the office of the 
presidency distracts from rather than solves the underlying problem.  
To the extent that citizens of Puerto Rico do not want a change in the 
current status of their island, however, they must accept the fact that 
under this framework the office of the presidency is out of their 
reach. 
 
(“No matter what position the individual ultimately takes in his or her conclusion of what 
Puerto Rico is or should be, the longstanding and current legacy of Puerto Rico’s connec-
tion to the United States is clearly that island inhabitants are second class citizens that do 
not have a voting representative in the United States and cannot vote for the President.”); 
Pedro A. Malavet, Puerto Rico:  Cultural Nation, American Colony, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 30 
(2001) (arguing that the Balzac decision created second class citizenship for Puerto Ri-
cans); Ediberto Román, Empire Forgotten:  The United States’s Colonization of Puerto Rico, 42 
VILL. L. REV. 1119, 1148 (1997) (arguing that, through the Jones Act, Congress extended 
second class citizenship to Puerto Ricans). 
226 See discussion supra Part III.D. 
227 For a comprehensive listing of those in favor and those opposed to commonwealth status, 
see José A. Cabranes, Puerto Rico:  Colonialism As Constitutional Doctrine, 100 HARV. L. REV. 
450, 460–61 n.55 (1986) (reviewing JUAN R. TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME COURT AND 
PUERTO RICO:  THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL (1985)). 
228 Consider the results of the last two referenda on the status of Puerto Rico.  In 1993, a 
combined 50.7% (46.3% for statehood and 4.4% for independence) voted for change; in 
1994, a combined 49% (46.5% for statehood and 2.5% for independence) voted for 
change, although this referendum was protested by a large segment of the electorate. See 
supra note 198. 
